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The P300 component of the human event-related brain potential has often been linked to the processing of rare, surprising events.
However, the formal computational processes underlying the generation of the P300 are not well known. Here, we formulate a simple
model of trial-by-trial learning of stimulus probabilities based on Information Theory. Specifically, we modeled the surprise associated
with the occurrence of a visual stimulus to provide a formal quantification of the “subjective probability” associated with an event.
Subjects performed a choice reaction time task, while we recorded their brain responses using electroencephalography (EEG). In each of
12 blocks, the probabilities of stimulus occurrence were changed, thereby creating sequences of trials with low, medium, and high
predictability. Trial-by-trial variations in the P300 component were best explained by a model of stimulus-bound surprise. This model
accounted for the data better than a categorical model that parametrically encoded the stimulus identity, or an alternative model of
surprise based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence. The present data demonstrate that trial-by-trial changes in P300 can be explained by
predictionsmade by an ideal observer keeping track of the probabilities of possible events. This provides evidence for theories proposing
a direct link between the P300 component and the processing of surprising events. Furthermore, this study demonstrates how model-
based analyses can be used to explain significant proportions of the trial-by-trial changes in human event-related EEG responses.
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Introduction
Late positive components of the human event-related brain po-
tential (ERP), in particular the P300, have traditionally been as-
sociated with the processing of unexpected events (Sutton et al.,
1965) (for review, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). The amplitude
of the P300 appears to be determined at least partly by the prob-
ability and relevance of an event (Duncan-Johnson andDonchin,
1977). Functionally, the P300 has commonly been linked to the
revision of a participant’s expectation about the current task con-
text (Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988; Barcelo et al.,
2006), as well as the updating of task-relevant information in
anticipation of subsequent events (Barcelo et al., 2008). The P300
has widely been suggested to be modulated at least in part by the
surprise of a stimulus (Donchin, 1981) and some authors have
used a terminology related to information theory to describe pro-
cesses underlying generation of the P300 (Ruchkin and Sutton,
1978; Johnson, 1986; Barcelo et al., 2008).
However, we are not aware of any study that has quantified fluc-
tuations in surprise on a trial-by-trial basis to study its impact on the
P300. A number of recent computational models have been pro-
posed that formally quantify the surprise conveyed by sensory stim-
uli. In thesemodels, the surpriseassociatedwithanevent relates to its
improbability, given a prediction of the occurrence of all possible
events (Strange et al., 2005). Computationally, it might be an effi-
cient strategy to focus processing resources on such surprising
events, because these provide the most information to an observer
(Baldi, 2005). One apparent advantage of using a model-based ap-
proach to quantify the intuitive notion of surprising events is that
competing models about the cognitive processes underlying ob-
servedneural data canbe formally tested (Corrado andDoya, 2007).
Using this approach, recent neuroimaging studies in humans have
shown that activity in a wide-spread parietal-premotor network is
associated with the surprise associated with the presentation of a
visual stimulus (Strange et al., 2005).
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Here, we asked whether trial-by-trial variations in the P300
can be explained by such a formal model of surprise and whether
this provides a more parsimonious description of the data than
alternative models. Healthy participants performed a choice re-
action time (RT) task while their brain activity was measured
using electroencephalography (EEG). We then quantified the
surprise associated with the unique stimulus sequence given to
every participant and investigated whether these quantifications
could explain variations in P300 on a single-trial basis. Our find-
ings show that trial-by-trial variabilities in the P300 component
are not random noise. A substantial proportion of this variability
can be explained by formal quantifications of surprise, providing
a direct confirmation of previous heuristics about the computa-
tions underlying the P300 component.
Materials andMethods
Participants, experimental design, and data acquisition. Twelve healthy
participants (eight women, age range 18–29 years), all with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity participated in the experiment. All
were recruited via the participants’ database of the Department of Psy-
chology of University College London. Experimental procedures were
approved by the local ethics committee and in accordance with the Dec-
laration of Helsinki. Participants received £15 compensation for their
time and travel.
Before the experiment, participants learned by trial-and-error the as-
sociations between four arbitrary visual stimuli (equated for surface area
and brightness) and four button responses (using the index and middle
fingers of both hands) for 60 trials. During this training, all stimuli were
presented an equal number of times in random order. If participants did
not perform the task without errors on the last 15 trials of the training
block, it was repeated. During the main experiment participants per-
formed 12 blocks of 60 trials of a choice reaction time task without
feedback (see Fig. 1a). Visual stimuli were presented for 200 ms each,
with a stimulus onset asynchrony of 2 s. Participants were required to
respond to each stimuluswith the previously associated button as quickly
as possible, but not at the expense of accuracy. The probability of the
occurrence of each event was manipulated between blocks such that the
relative probabilities of events were either 0.25 for each event (low pre-
dictability), [0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1] (medium predictability), or [0.7, 0.1, 0.1,
0.1] (high predictability). Participants were not informed about these
probabilities. They were simply instructed to respond as quickly as pos-
sible to each presented stimulus and that the four different stimuli were
randomly distributed across blocks. All stimuli occurred equally often
over the course of the experiment and all stimuli had an equal behavioral
relevance. Participants were given a break between blocks; they were free
to initiate the subsequent block at their own pace.
The experiment was realized using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (Univer-
sity College London, http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.
html) for Matlab (The Mathworks). EEG was recorded (bandpass filter:
0.05–100 Hz, 500 Hz sampling rate) using a Synamps2 amplifier (Neu-
roscan) from the following electrode positions, using Ag/AgCl electrodes
mounted in an elastic electrode cap: AF3, AF4, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5,
FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4,
P8, PO3, PO4, Oz, and left and right mastoids. Horizontal and vertical
eyemovements were recorded using electrodes placed lateral to both eyes
and above and below the left eye. Electrode AFz served as reference
during recording and the electrode common was placed on the partici-
pants’ chin. Electrode impedances were kept at10 k.
Electrophysiological analyses. EEG data were analyzed using EEGLAB
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004), implemented in Matlab 7.1. Each partici-
pant’s EEG data were bandpass filtered (0.3–30 Hz), down-sampled to
250 Hz, and re-referenced to average reference. Subsequently, epochs of
600 to 1400 ms around the presentation of the visual stimuli were
extracted from each trial and linearly detrended. During the first step of
artifact rejection, epochs containing unique, nonstereotyped artifacts
(swallowing, head movements, etc) were rejected. In a second step, re-
peatedly occurring, stereotyped artifacts were removed using indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) (Jung et al., 2000a), which has been used
in a number of recent studies on P300 (Debener et al., 2005a; Eichele et
al., 2005; Jongsma et al., 2006). This method assumes that the EEG data
recorded at the electrode level is a linear mixture of underlying brain
signals and artifactual signals such as eye blinks, muscle activity, cardiac
signals, and line noise. The ICA algorithm (extended infomax ICA)
(Makeig et al., 1996) finds an “unmixing” square matrix of the size of the
number of channels, which is thenmatrix-multipliedwith the rawdata to
reveal maximally temporally independent components. Each indepen-
dent component can then be characterized by a time course and a scalp
topography. All individual independent components whose signal and
scalp topography resembled known artifacts were removed from the
dataset (Jung et al., 2000a,b). The remaining components were back-
projected to the scalp to reveal EEG data without the contributions of the
artifacts. Epochs were baseline corrected using the interval 400–0 ms
before stimulus presentation as the baseline.
From these data, single-trial P300s were estimated at electrode Pz,
where this ERP component is traditionally reported to be maximal
(Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Debener et al., 2005a; Jongsma et
al., 2006). ERPs were created as trial averages for each participant and for
each a priori stimulus category. To estimate single-trial amplitudes, for
each participant, the time point at which the averaged P300s were mod-
ulatedmaximally by relative stimulus frequency was determined. Single-
trial P300 estimates were then extracted over a window of 60 ms
around this time point of maximal modulation (cf. Jongsma et al., 2006;
Barcelo et al., 2008). This method was chosen over simple peak detection
(Be´nar et al., 2007) to capture the condition effects and improve the
reliability of single-trial amplitude measures, similar to previous studies
(Debener et al., 2005b).
Ideal observers. We modeled participants’ learning of the task by as-
suming they acted as ideal observers who learn the probability of select-
ing each of the four responses after presentation of the stimuli. Following
previous studies (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann et
al., 2008), we assume that participants start each block assuming that all
events are equally likely and update their estimate of the probability of
each event type on each trial, based on the events they previously ob-
served. The same procedure was repeated for each block, i.e., the maxi-
mum number of observations was the number of trials in a block. This
amounts to assuming that each participant starts each block “anew,”
withoutmemory of the previous blocks. Although futureworkmay focus
more directly on modeling different types of information transfers be-
tween blocks, previous work has shown the suitability of this assumption
(Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann et al., 2008).
Formally, we can consider a discrete variable, x, that can take values
from 1 toK, where in our caseK 4, i.e., each trial contained one of four
possible events, corresponding to the four visual stimuli and their respec-
tive responses. This distribution is parameterized by the random vector
P(x) [p1,…, pK] (whichwe abbreviate usingP(x) p), whose elements
sum to one and we denote the probability of the kth event as P(x k)
pk. This is a multinomial distribution, where pk is the probability of the
kth trial type occurring. We will refer to this as the generative distribu-
tion, as it was from this that a sequence of events were sampled. A simple
example is a coin toss whereK 2. The probability of “heads” and “tails”
is then given by P(x  heads)  p1 and P(x  tails)  p2 respectively,
which sum to one.
The aim of the observer, i.e., the participant, is to estimate the above
distribution of event probabilities, using the information conveyed by
the encountered train of stimuli. In other words, the observer tries to
estimate parameters, i.e., probabilities, contained in the vector p. Given a
sample of j events, denoted by Xj  {x 1, …, xj}, there are a number of
ways to estimate these. An issue with using the maximum likelihood
estimate is that the observer’s estimate of pkwill be zero if event k has not
been observed. For example, if only three tosses of a coin are sampled
with the outcome of three heads, then the estimate of the probability of
heads is equal to one. A prediction based on this small sample would be
that a tail could never occur, which is contrary to intuition. This can be
resolved by giving the observer prior knowledge, as done in the Bayesian
paradigm.We can assure that the observer has a greater than zero expect-
ancy of all stimuli occurring by giving it a uniform prior, i.e., by having it
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assume initially that all stimuli are equally likely to occur. For the current
setting, a prior distribution indicating the belief in all parameters before
any observations is given by a prior Dirichlet distribution. A uniform
Dirichlet prior over p is parameterized by a vector  [1, …, k] and
written as P( p) Dir( p;k). Choosing all elements of  equal to one
represents the prior belief that the multinomial parameters are uniform.
In the present case, this results in a belief that all four stimuli are likely to
occur 25% of the time.
The degree of belief in the estimated probabilities p will change when
an event is observed. The posterior distribution representing the belief
after j trials, Xj, is given by
P pXj,  Dirpj;nkj  k Dj , (1)
where nk
j refers to the number of occurrences of outcome k up until
observation j. In words, this expression states that the estimated proba-
bility over the parameters p is determined by the observations Xj and a
uniform prior (parameterized by ). This is again a Dirichlet distribu-
tion, parameterized by the vectorwith elements equal to nk
j k. Because
the observer knows nk
j and k is fixed to be uniform, the posterior distri-
bution can be computed easily and updated for each new observation.
We abbreviate the estimated distribution following j trials as Dj.
The posterior distribution after observing trial j 1, i.e.,Dj  1, can be
used to predict the probability of each event occurring, i.e., the multino-
mial distribution, at the jth trial. The expression for this is
p xj  kXj1, 
nk
j1  1
Nj1  K
 p˜k
j , (2)
where the total number of observations up to the trial preceding j is
Nj1  
i1
K
ni
j1 , (3)
which is equal to j 1. In words, the predicted probability of observing
event (trial type) k on the jth trial, given all preceding observations and a
uniform prior is equal to p˜k
j , where we have used the tilde to denote that
it is a prediction. This quantity changes with each new observation and is
the reason for including j in the superscript. This can then be updated
with each new event (trial) (cf. Strange et al., 2005).
Quantifying surprise. Following Strange et al. (2005), we can quantify
the surprise, I, on each trial as follows (cf. Shannon, 1948):
I xj  k   log2p˜k
j . (4)
This states that the surprise of observing event type k at the jth trial is
equal to the negative log of its predicted probability given all preceding
trials. Accordingly, the amount of surprise conveyed by the occurrence of
an event is high when an infrequent stimulus occurs in a stimulus se-
quence with high predictability. For example, in highly predictable
blocks ([0.7, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1]), the probability of one particular event is high,
whereas the other three events occur only rarely. Given repeated samples
of this distribution, these low frequency events are more surprising. An
event ismore surprisingwhen occurringwith 0.10 probability, compared
with an event with a 0.70 probability of occurring (Fig. 1c). Note that in
this experiment the generative distribution did not include dependencies
between consecutive events. That is, the event at one time did not depend
on earlier events. This is the same as in the study by Strange et al. (2005)
and different to that investigated by Harrison et al. (2006), where the
current event depended on the previous. Given the assumption that par-
ticipants start each block anew, we refer to this model as blockwise sur-
prise, Ib.
Alternative models. We compared the model of the previous section
with a number of alternatives. The ideal observer described above as-
sumed the generative model being stationary, i.e., unchanging within a
block. This assumption is ideal in that it matches the true distribution
used to generate trial types in the experiment. Furthermore, the model
described above assumes participants start each block anew with the
expectation that all events occur equally often, i.e., with a uniform (i.e.,
flat, uninformative) prior. Alternatively, one might expect that partici-
pants view each block merely as a continuation of the previous block,
such that the experiment can be seen as one long session. We therefore
also created a model based on an observer with no forgetting, here re-
ferred to as experiment-wise surprise, Ie (Fig. 1d). This is suboptimal
because contingencies did change from block to block.
An alternative formulation of surprise has been suggested by Baldi et
al. (Baldi, 2002; Itti and Bladi, 2006), based on the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence (Kullback, 1959; Clover and Thomas, 1999). The KL diver-
gence is a scalar quantity that summarizes the difference between two
probability distributions. In our case, it is used to measure the change in
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm and examples of surprisemodels. a, Example of the task. Participantswere trained on stimulus–response associations (top right) and then performed a simple
choice-RT task. Visual stimuli were presented every 2 s for 200 ms each, requiring the participants to respond with the previously associated button. b, Raster plots of events sampled from two
distributionswhere the probability of event 1was either greater than all other events (highpredictability environment) or the same (low-predictability environment). c– e, For each unique stimulus
sequence models of blockwise stimulus-bound surprise (c), Ib, stimulus-bound surprise with no forgetting between blocks (d), Ie, and KL surprise (e).
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belief about the stimulus probabilities, P(x), after an event (i.e., visual
stimulus). If this change is large then the event has a high degree of
“surprise”, compared with one that has little or no effect. For the current
experimental setting, the Kullback–Leibler divergence (KL surprise) at
trial j is a function of the current, prior, and posterior distributions,Dj 
1 and Dj (cf. Baldi, 2002):
KLsurprise KLDj1,Dj . (5)
In words, the (blockwise) KL surprise is the “distance” between the dis-
tributions before and after observing the jth trial. Intuitively this means
that events can be quantified in terms of howmuch they change posterior
beliefs.
The difference between theKLdivergencemeasure of surprise (see Fig.
1e) and surprise as defined in Equation 4 is that the former is an average
quantity, i.e., summed over all probabilities in the distribution. In con-
trast, the latter is a function of the predicted probability of an observed
event, i.e., trial type presented to the subject. In other words, the KL
divergence is a distance measure between the current, prior, and poste-
rior distributions, whereas Ib is a function of the predicted probability of
the observed event, i.e., just one event and not an average over all possible
events. The KL surprise measure relates to those proposed by Ruchkin
and Sutton (1978) and Kopp (2007) to account for variations in P300.
Last, we included a conventional explanation using a categorical
model of events parametrically modulated by the probability of occur-
rence. In this model, each trial had one of the values [0.10, 0.25, 0.40,
0.70]. This regressor models variance related to stimulus probability
within a block and does not take into account any learning; hence it is
similar to the traditional method of averaging ERP data over a priori
probabilities. Note that this model is similar to the model used by
Duncan-Johnson and Donchin (1977), who used a linear regression
analysis of single-trial P300 amplitudes and a priori event probabilities.
Model estimation and comparison. To test the hypothesis that surprise
can predict event-related P300 responses we used a hierarchical general
linear model (GLM), in which the parameters were optimized using
empirical Bayes (Friston et al., 2007).
Data from all S subjects were concatenated in a vector Y of length T	
S, whereT is the number of trials per subject. These data were fitted using
a three-level hierarchical model of the following structure:
Y  Z1w1  e1
w1  Z2w2  e2
w2  e3
e1  N0,11ITS
e2  N0,21IPS
e3  N0,31 . (6)
The parametersweights {w1,w2} scale each columnof the designmatrices
{Z1, Z2}. Hyperparameters {1, 2, 3} control the precision (inverse
variance) of noise at each level, given by {e1, e2, e3}; these correspond to
within-subject error, between-subject error and shrinkage priors on the
group-parameters, w2. I is an identity matrix. The first level design ma-
trix, Z1 was block-diagonal, with dimensions TS	 PS, with P regressors
per subject. These regressors are the explanatory variables provided by
our different models of the task sequence (see above). Additional regres-
sors indicated the identity of trials on which participants responded er-
roneously, trials that were rejected during the preprocessing of the EEG
data, and a constant term. Bymodeling incorrect responses explicitly, we
accounted for the known effects of correct or incorrect responding on
reaction times and P300 (Krigolson and Holroyd, 2007). The second
design matrix, Z2 1S R IP, represented between-subject differences in
the parameter weights, where 1S is a column of ones of length S. We
computed the posterior densities over model parameters and hyperpa-
rameters using standard techniques (Friston et al., 2007), where a poste-
rior density represents the degree of belief in a parameter given data, i.e.,
single-trial P300 estimate.
The model evidence p( yMm), is the probability of the data given the
mth model, which was approximated using the marginal likelihood
(Penny et al., 2004; Friston et al., 2007). It is important to note that this
quantity is computed by integrating out all model [hyper]-parameters
and so it includes a complexity term aswell as an accuracy term (expected
likelihood). This evidence was used to compare competing models de-
fined in terms of the explanatory variables in Z1.
We compared models using the ratio of the evidence for two compet-
ingmodels known as the Bayes Factor (Kass and Raftery, 1995). This can
be formulated as a difference in approximate log model evidence for two
modelsm and n (Fm and Fn) as follows:
Fm  Fn  lnpyMmpyMnfexpFm  Fn pyMmpyMn . (7)
Here, a difference of 3 corresponds approximately to 20:1 odds, i.e.,
exp(3)
 20, in favor of modelm over n (Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann
et al., 2008). In the present case, positive values reflect stronger evidence
in favor of the model containing surprise Ib, whereas negative values
would indicate stronger evidence for the alternative models tested.
Results
Behavioral results
Inspection of average reaction times on correct trials showed that
participants’ reaction times were affected by changes in probabi-
listic context. A repeated-measures ANOVA with factor “proba-
bility” (4 levels: 0.1, 0.25, 0.40, and 0.70, indicating the overall a
priori probability of a stimulus within a block) showed that par-
ticipants responded slower to stimuli with a lower (0.10; 573 21
ms; RT  SEM) probability of occurrence, than stimuli with a
higher probability of occurrence (0.70; 427  18 ms): F(3,9) 
107.904, p  0.001. Participants responded incorrectly on 4.2%
(SEM  0.69) of trials, making more errors in response to less
frequent stimuli (F(3,9) 15.01, p 0.001).
Event-related potentials: trial-averaged results
Figure 2 shows the scalp topographies and grand average ERP
over all trials, showing the traditional distribution of the P300.
Our statistical analyses focused on the single-trial estimates of
P300. Central latency of the time window used for single-trial
P300 estimates was on average 531 (SEM  24, range 392–660)
ms after stimulus onset. To verify that our averaged single-trial
P300 estimates showed the same scalp topography and ordering
by stimulus probability as commonly reported for average P300s,
averaged single-trial estimates were entered into a repeated mea-
sures ANOVAwith factors electrode (4 levels: Fz, Cz, Pz, andOz)
and probability (4 levels: 0.10, 0.25, 0.40, and 0.70). This analysis
showed that average single-trial estimates differed reliably be-
tween electrodes (F(3,9)  19.484, p  0.001) and probability
(F(3,9)  14.936, p  0.001). The difference in average P300 for
each probability was most pronounced at electrode Pz (elec-
trode 	 probability interaction: F(9,3)  7.659, p  0.001), as is
well established for the P300 (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin,
1977; Debener et al., 2005a) (Fig. 2c). This ordering of single-trial
estimates is not due simply to a potential confounding relation-
ship between trials rejected by the artifact correction and a priori
stimulus probability, as there as no systematic relationship be-
tween the two (F(3,33) 0.008, not significant).
Event-related potentials: model-based single-trial analyses
Having replicated the traditional P300 effects in choice reaction
time tasks, we subsequently focused on themodel-based analyses
of the single-trial P300 estimates, following the procedure advo-
cated by MacKay (1992). First, each model was fitted to the data
using the procedure described above. Second, themodel evidence
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was calculated for each model and the models were compared
using the Bayes factor. This analysis showed that the blockwise
surprise Ib model provided a more parsimonious account of the
data when compared to a categorical model of a priori stimulus
probabilities that was used by Duncan-Johnson and Donchin
(1977). Moreover, the surprise Ib model was favored over two
alternative models of surprise, the KL surprise and a model of
surprise without forgetting Ie. The direct comparison of surprise
Ib with all other candidate models is presented in Figure 3a. A
log-evidence ratio3 indicates 20:1 odds in favor of the surprise
Ib model.
Having established that the surprise Ib model provided the
most parsimonious explanation of the
data, the group posterior density over
the model parameter indicates the contri-
bution of surprise to the data, i.e., the
single-trial P300 estimate (cf. the  in a
standard regression analysis). This analysis
showed that variations in P300 could be
explained by surprise, with more surpris-
ing events leading to an increased P300
(5.9 V/bit) (Fig. 3b). This finding was
consistent across all participants (Fig. 3c).
Discussion
We investigated whether single-trial P300
estimates in a choice reaction time task
could be explained by a formal model of
the surprise conveyed by events experi-
enced by participants. Behavioral data in-
dicated that on average participants re-
sponded slower to less frequently
occurring, i.e., more surprising, events.
Consistent with earlier reports on the
P300, we found that averaged P300s over
central-parietal electrode sites interacted
with the relative probability of event oc-
currence. Importantly, a model of the sur-
prise within a block of trials provided a
more parsimonious explanation of single-
trial P300 changes than alternativemodels,
including a categorical model of stimulus
frequency, an alternative model of surprise based on the KL di-
vergence, and surprise without forgetting. This novel model-
based approach applied to single-trial EEG data allows for a for-
mal quantification of the psychological variable “surprise” and its
relationship to the psychophysiological marker P300.
Previous studies on the P300 have introduced the term “sub-
jective probability” to denote that it is participants’ estimation of
the environment that is crucial in predictingmodulations in P300
(Donchin and Coles, 1988). This has led to the suggestion that
P300 reflects the updating of information in anticipation of sub-
sequent information processing (Sutton et al., 1965; Nieuwen-
huis et al., 2005; Verleger et al., 2005; Barcelo et al., 2008). The
P300 has previously been linked with information theoretic con-
cepts (Ruchkin and Sutton, 1978; Johnson, 1986; Barcelo et al.,
2006, 2008; Barcelo and Knight, 2007) or Bayes’ theory (Kopp,
2007).Here, we draw on information theoretic concepts to inves-
tigate the trial-by-trial influence of stimulus-bound surprise on
P300 variation. Characterizing the subjective estimate of task
probabilities has only recently become a major focus of research
in cognitive and neurosciences (Oaksford and Chater, 2007). In
the present case, we used a model of how the “subjective proba-
bility” is represented and updated over time, rather than how it
changes on average.
To achieve this, the present approach combines two novel
methodologies that, to our knowledge, have not been combined
earlier in studies of event-related potentials. First, the model-
based approach provides models about the trial-by-trial varia-
tions of task states internal to the participant, such as stimulus
expectancy and reward estimate (cf. Corrado and Doya, 2007).
These states are not directly accessible to the experimenter using
traditional analysis methods [for a similar point, see Strange et al.
(2005) and Behrens et al. (2007)]. Here, we modeled each partic-
ipant as an ideal observer, who updates his belief about events by
Figure 2. Electrophysiological data. a, Scalp distribution (electrode Pz marked in cyan). b, Grand average waveform at elec-
trode Pz. c, Average single-trial amplitude per stimulus category over midline electrode sites, showing effects traditionally
reported for the P300.d, Results for two representative participants showing evoked potentials averaged to relative occurrence of
stimuli each block (top right, 0.10 in blue, 0.25 in red, 0.40 in green, 0.70 in black) (top) and scatter plot of single-trial ERP
amplitudes and blockwise surprise Ib (bottom). Scatter plot data were normalized for display purposes only. For ERPs, only the 200 ms
before stimulus presentation (at time0) to 800ms following stimulus presentation interval is plotted, for display purposes only.
Figure 3. Model-based analysis of EEG data. a, Model comparison results comparing block-
wise surprise Ib, to the traditional categorical model, KL surprise, and surprise without forget-
ting Ie. We report the log Bayes factor (or likelihood ratio), so that positive values 3 indicate
evidence (20:1 odds) in favor of Ib (indicated by dotted line).b, Posterior density of GLMparam-
etersweighting the explanatory variable containing blockwise surprise at the group level. Error
bar indicates SEM. c, Posterior densities showing influence of surprise on single-trial P300
estimate for each participant. Error bars indicate STD.
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combining previous knowledge with a current event. Second,
although previous studies have compared predictions from com-
putational models qualitatively with the results from averaged
evoked potentials (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Cohen and Ranga-
nath, 2007), recent advances in EEG data processing, such as ICA
(Eichele et al., 2005; Debener et al., 2006; Jongsma et al., 2006),
now allow for trial-by-trial analyses. We here combine this
model-based approach and the single-trial data analysis by for-
mally testing the predictions of the model to the data. Moreover,
this combined approach allows for comparing the evidence of
different models, given the observed ERP data. The present ap-
proach differs from that used by Duncan-Johnson and Donchin
(1977). These authors used regression analysis to fit single-trial
P300 amplitudes to a model of a priori stimulus probability.
Their approach thus focused on the overall true probabilities that
were a priori known to the experimenter, but not the participant.
In contrast, we here used a formal model of how participants’
learned these probabilities over the course of the experiment. In
addition, we scrutinized our model against several alternative
models.
We have modeled surprise Ib here according to measures de-
scribed by information theory (Shannon, 1948; Clover and
Thomas, 1999), consistent with previous studies showing that
surprise is associatedwith activity in an extended corticothalamic
network (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006) and changes
in corticospinal excitability (Bestmann et al., 2008). Here, we
assumed that events were stationary and unchanging within a
block, matching the true generative distribution from which
events were sampled. Therefore, all previous blocks and events
were forgotten in an optimal way and trials within the current
block were weighted equally. Note that this assumption is ideal in
relation to the actual experimental paradigm but assumes partic-
ipants were privy to different blocks of events being sampled
from different distributions. We therefore included an alterna-
tive model in which our ideal observers had suboptimal (i.e., no)
forgetting with respect to the actual experimental paradigm. In
the present experiment, a model of an ideal observer beginning
each block with flat priors, was superior to a model without
forgetting.
Moreover, we also compared ourmodel to an alternativemea-
sure of surprise based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence. This
latter measure can be taken as a formal description of “equivoca-
tion” that has been suggested to underlay the generation of the
P300 (Ruchkin and Sutton, 1978; see also Kopp, 2007). Although
the present results agree with these authors’ suggestion that trial-
by-trial estimates of surprise based on each participant’s unique
trial history is important in predicting fluctuations in P300, we
show that surprise Ib based on only the estimated probability of
the stimulus presented on a given trial rather than the full distri-
bution of trials, provides a better explanation to characterize
changes in P300.
A remaining question is how the present modeling approach
of single-trial P300 links with recent neurophysiological models
of P300 generation. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2005) proposed that the
P300 reflects the arrival of a phasic norepinephrine (NE) signal in
cortical areas, which serves to increase signal transmission in the
cortex. This proposal is based on a number of considerations,
such as the similarities between the ante-conditions for phasic
increases in NE and the generation of the P300 and between the
target areas of NE projections and known P300 generators, and
pharmacological studies that seem broadly consistent with this
proposal (for review, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). In this re-
spect, it is interesting to note that recent advances in computa-
tional neuroscience point to a role of NE in the processing of
contextual uncertainty. Specifically, Dayan and Yu (2006) pro-
posed that phasic NE signals unexpected changes in the world
within the context of a task. The hope of the approach taken in the
current study is to use such computationally informedmodels to
investigate the link between phasic NE to single-trial P300 data.
In the present task, each visual stimulus was linked to a dis-
tinctmotor response and other factors thatmight influence P300,
such as stimulus salience and task relevance (Johnson, 1986; De
Bruijn et al., 2004), were kept constant. Therefore, we cannot
determine whether the P300 modulation was purely due to the
surprise conveyed by the visual stimuli, or whether it was related
to the response selection on each trial (cf. Koechlin and Summer-
field, 2007). Previous studies indeed show that P300 modulation
can be explained in terms of the probabilistic updating of the
corresponding motor response (Barcelo and Knight, 2007;
Barcelo et al., 2008).
We have referred to the centroparietal component we found
as the P300. Other studies have made a further distinction be-
tween the so-called P3a and P3b subcomponents (Polich, 2007).
The P3b is the component commonly referred to as “P300,” and
is commonly evoked by target stimuli at around 300–600 ms,
similar to the component observed in the present study. In con-
trast, the P3a is linked to infrequent, task-novel events, and has a
frontocentral maximum occurring at 250–400 ms
(Courchesne et al., 1975; Friedman et al., 2001). In addition, the
P3a component habituates fast, possibly following the pattern
predicted by the KL surprise, rather than the surprise Ib that
predicts P3b. This may be tested directly in experiments specifi-
cally designed for eliciting P3a responses (Debener et al., 2005a),
using themodeling framework presented here. The present study
did not focus on the difference between the novelty and
attention-related P3a and the target and response-related P3b
component. Moreover, our focus on the amplitude of P300 did
not focus on potential information conveyed by P300 latency
(Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988). Nevertheless, the
amplitude contains sufficient structure that can be explained by a
formal definition of surprise. By taking into account P3b versus
P3a effects and latency information, it may be possible to con-
sider surprise in the context of othermental states contributing to
goal-oriented behavior.
To conclude,model-based single-trial analyses can be used for
testing hypotheses of event-related EEG fluctuations. This ap-
proach provides a bridge between cognitive theories and more
formal neurophysiological models of the P300 ERP. The focus on
single-trial EEG data provides a more direct link to behavior and
neural processing than averaged EEG activity (Debener et al.,
2006). This is supported by our observation that P300 trial-by-
trial amplitude fluctuations are not random noise, and can be
explained by a formal model of surprise experienced in the con-
text of a behavioral task. Our findings provide direct evidence for
theories linking the P300 component and the processing of sur-
prising events.
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